东北黑土地可持续利用的多主体协同路径研究

Research on Multi-subject Collaborative Pathways for Sustainable Utilization of Black Soil in Northeast China

摘要:

中国东北黑土地退化问题已对区域粮食安全与生态系统稳定性构成系统性威胁，亟需构建政府主导、企业参与、农户协同的多主体共治机制，这是实现黑土地资源可持续利用的根本途径。本研究以政府、农业企业及农户为博弈主体，构建三方动态演化博弈模型，结合数值仿真对比分析单策略与组合策略下的决策特征及演化趋势。结果表明：单一政策工具(如政府补贴或企业罚款)对提升农户保护意愿的效果有限，且容易导致系统策略失衡。相比之下，“高补贴+高罚款”的政策组合能够显著加快系统收敛速度，有效引导政府、企业和农户三方策略快速趋近“严格监管-绿色生产-积极保护”的理想均衡状态。然而，补贴额度过高反而会使系统偏离最优演化路径。当满足以下条件时，系统可达到最优稳定状态：政府监管成本控制在合理区间、企业绿色技术边际收益达到阈值水平、农户补贴额度设置适当。通过政策组合优化强化黑土地保护效能，构建“政策引导-技术支撑-行为激励”的三维框架，为东北黑土区综合治理提供了理论依据与实践参考。

Abstract:

The problem of black soil degradation in Northeast China has constituted a systematic threat to regional food security and ecosystem stability, and there is an urgent need to construct a multi-subject comanagement mechanism led by the government, with enterprise participation and farmer collaboration—a fundamental way to realize the sustainable use of black soil resources. In this study, we take the government, agricultural enterprises and farmers as the game subjects, construct a three-party dynamic evolutionary game model, and analyze the decision-making characteristics and evolutionary trends under single strategies and combined strategies with numerical simulation. The results show that a single policy tool（e.g., government subsidies or enterprise fines） has a limited effect on enhancing farmers’ willingness to protect black soil, and is likely to lead to systematic strategic imbalance. In contrast, the policy combination of “high subsidies + high fines” can significantly accelerate system convergence, effectively guiding the strategies of the government, enterprises and farmers to rapidly converge to the ideal equilibrium state of “strict regulation-green production-active protection”. However,the study also finds that excessively high subsidy levels can cause the system to deviate from the optimal evolutionary path. Specifically, the system can reach the optimal stable state when the following conditions are met:government regulatory costs are controlled within a reasonable range, the marginal return of enterprises’ green technology reaches the threshold level, and farmers’ subsidy levels are set appropriately. By optimizing policy combinations to strengthen the effectiveness of black soil protection, a three-dimensional framework of “policy guidance-technology support-behavioral incentives” is constructed, which provides a theoretical basis and practical reference for the comprehensive governance of northeast China’s black soil region.